Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 35
Issue 5 October 2002

Article 7

2002

Health Versus Trade: The Future of the WHO's Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control
Alyssa Woo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alyssa Woo, Health Versus Trade: The Future of the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1731 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol35/iss5/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Health Versus Trade: The Future of
the WHO's Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control

ABSTRACT

On October 16, 2000, the World Health Organization
(WHO) began the first session of negotiations of its first
international health treaty, the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC). Scheduled for adoption in May 2003,
the FCTC is a comprehensive multilateral treaty that will cover
everything from tobacco smuggling to tobacco advertising and
the extent of the liability of tobacco companies.
This Note argues that even-handed domestic measures
implementing the FCTC will be protected from international,
trade-basedcomplaints because the World Trade Organization's
dispute settlement system has given sufficient and appropriate
content to the health exception to the normal trade rules under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Therefore, this
Note suggests that, on balance, a new WHO judicial body would
not substantially promote the goals of the FCTC, although
treaties that are more technical than the FCTC may suggest a
different answer.
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A.

I. INTRODUCTION
Young women in Benson & Hedges T-shirts gave away free
cigarettes to the crowd at a beach volleyball tournament in The
Gambia, one of Africa's poorest countries.1 The organizer of this
youth event, held during the school holidays, was British American
Tobacco (BAT), the producer of the two main cigarette brands in The
2
As the cigarette
Gambia: Piccadilly and Benson & Hedges.
Broadcasting
a
British
up,
light
representatives helped youngsters to
Corporation (BBC) news investigation observed that some of the
3
consumers of the free cigarettes appeared to be underage. Although
samples were only supposed to be given to people over the age of 18,
4
When
the young women did not check the age of the recipients.
confronted, one woman responded, "We only give free cigarettes to big
5
boys."
Until recently, The Gambia had been one of the few countries to
ban cigarette advertising. 6 After the ban was lifted about five years
ago following a military coup, cigarette sales in The Gambia doubled
almost overnight. 7 Now, in a nation where youth soccer teams cannot
even afford soccer balls, multinational tobacco corporations market
free cigarettes at football tournaments,
their products by handing out
8
music concerts, and parties.
In response to the BBC news investigation, BAT stated that it

UK Tobacco Firm Targets African Youth, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 20, 2000,
1.
at http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/health/newsid_933000/933430.stm.
Id.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.

6.

Id. See also World Health Organization (WHO) Tobacco Free Initiative,

Tobacco Control Country Profiles-Appendix B: Legislation, at http://tobacco.who.int/

page.cfm?sid=57 (listing domestic legislation regarding tobacco).
7.
8.

UK Tobacco Firm TargetsAfrican Youth, supra note 1.
Id.
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would "re-brief' its Gambian programs to make sure that children
under 18 did not receive free cigarettes. 9 Dr. James Mwanzia, the
World Health Organization's (WHO) representative in The Gambia,
commented, "It is the height of hypocrisy, because how do you sponsor
a health event like a volleyball match and then give out cigarettes?" 10
Clive Bates, director of Action on Smoking and Health, remarked, "As
soon as they think no one is looking, they are going after the teenage
market."ll
The Gambian experience is only one case of the global tobacco
epidemic promoted by the tobacco industry. The seriousness of the
tobacco epidemic cannot be doubted. In Africa, a recent WHO survey
12
found that one in five children under the age of 15 now smoke.
Worldwide, smoking kills one in ten adults every year, making it the
leading cause of preventable death. 13 Country-specific analyses of the
tobacco industry by the World Bank in collaboration with the WHO
find that tobacco addiction imposes high opportunity costs on many
poor households, who spend significant proportions of their income on
14
tobacco instead of on nutrition and other family needs.
By 2030, the World Bank predicts that smoking will kill about
one in six adults globally per year. 1' Most of the projected deaths will
occur in low and middle-income countries. 16
As markets in
industrialized countries decline, and as tobacco companies target
developing countries and the world youth, the disease burden caused
by tobacco usage increases at an alarming rate. 17 The WHO hopes to
curb these threats to human health through its first treaty, the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC or Convention).' 8
This Note argues that although certain discriminatory domestic
measures have been struck down in the past under the dispute

9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
WHO, Economics of Tobacco Control,at 2, WHO Doc. A/FCTCJWGI/2 (Aug.
20, 1999), at http://www.who.int.gb.fctc.wgl/PDFwgl/elt2.pdf (summarizing WORLD
BANK, CURBING THE EPIDEMIC (1999)) [hereinafter Economics of Tobacco Control],
14.
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body of the WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control, Activities Since the Previous Session, at 1, WHO Doc.
AIFCTC/INB5/4 (Sept. 12, 2002), at http://www.who.intlgb/fctc/PDF/inb5/einb54.pdf.
15.
Id.
16.

Economics of Tobacco Control, supra note 13, at 2.

17.
WHO, Opening Statement by the Director-General, at 1-2, WHO Doc.
AIFCTC/INB1/DIV/3 (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/inbl/
PDFinbl/elinbd3.pdf; Burden of Disease, at http://tobacco.who.int/page.cfm?sid=47
(last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
18.
WHO Tobacco Free Initiative, The Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control: A Primer, WHO Doc. WHO/NCD/TFI/99.8 Rev. 3, at http://tobacco.who.int/
repository/stp4l/Primeren.pdf [hereinafter Primer].
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settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO), evenhanded domestic measures implementing the FCTC should withstand
scrutiny because WTO case law has given sufficient and appropriate
content to the exception for health under Article XX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This Note also argues that
a new WHO judicial body would not be desirable at this point,
although future, more technical treaties would present a stronger
case for that type of organ.
Part II frames the debate surrounding global tobacco control.
Part III introduces the WHO and its lawmaking prior to the FCTC.
Part IV outlines the FCTC's substantive and procedural features and
highlights sections of the FCTC that could lessen its effectiveness.
Part V provides background about the international judicial system
and the WTO's dispute settlement system. Part VI examines the
WTO's trade agreements and decisions as they apply to the FCTC.
Part VII argues that, on balance, a new WHO judicial body is not yet
necessary to promote the goals of the WHO with respect to the FCTC.
Because the FCTC is scheduled for adoption in May 2003,19 this
Note assumes that a positive course of events will occur. For
example, the U.S. adoption of the FCTC via the president's executive
treaty power with the requisite concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senate is assumed.20 Another assumption is that domestic legislation
in Member States accurately implements the terms of the treaty.
This Note looks down the legal road to evaluate the possible conflicts
with the FCTC and ways to promote the WHO's health objectives in
the event that international disputes and judicial law-making follow
the adoption of the FCTC.

II.

WHY SHOULD WE HAVE GLOBAL TOBACCO CONTROL?

Just as treating malaria cannot be done without understanding
the behavior of its vector, the mosquito, an understanding of the
tobacco business and the evolution of its business defenses is
necessary to the cure for the tobacco epidemic, according to Dr. Gro
Harlem Brundtland, Director-General of the WHO. 21 In the early

19.
WHO, Secretariat Update: Provisional Timetable for the Negotiation
Process and Projected Costs, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB1/3 (Sept. 5, 2000), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/inbl/PDFinbl/elinb3.pdf [hereinafter Secretariat Update:
Timetable, at
Alliance,
Convention
Provisional Timetable]; Framework
http://www.fctc.org/timetable.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2002).
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. "[The President] shall have Power, by and
20.
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur." Id.
Director-General's Office, at http://www.who.int/director-general (stating
21.
that Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland took office on July 21, 1998, and her term of office is

2002] '

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL

1735

stages of the debate about tobacco and tobacco control, the industry
denied that tobacco was dangerous. 22

However, as researchers

described the increased risks of heart disease and cancer with
increasing certainty, the tobacco industry began to make economic
arguments against tobacco control and to use secret financial and
23
political strategies.
Formerly confidential tobacco company strategy documents that
are now publicly available demonstrate the scale and intensity of the
industry's global efforts to protect the tobacco business. 24 They prove
that the tobacco industry has systematically used secretive and
unprincipled means to discredit legitimate organizations like the
WHO that push for tobacco control. 25
Statements of tobacco
objectives contain specific references to the WHO: "Attack W.H.O.,"
"[Try] to stop the development towards a Third World commitment
against tobacco," "Discredit key individuals," "[Contain WHO's]
funding from private sources," "Work with journalists to question
WHO priorities, budget, role in social engineering, etc.," and
"[Establish] ITGA [International Tobacco Growers Association] [as a]
front for our third world lobby activities at WHO. '2 6
These
documents state that "WHO's impact and influence is indisputable"
and that the industry must contain, neutralize and reorient the WHO
27
to protect the tobacco business.

five years); Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Response of the Director General to the Report
of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, at 1, WHO Doc.
WHO/DG/SP (Oct. 6, 2000), at http://tobacco.who.int/repository/stp58/inquiryDGresl.pdf;
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS, TOBACCO INDUSTRY
STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION (July 2000), at http://tobacco.who.int/repository/stp58/who-inquiry.pdf
[hereinafter TOBACCO INDUSTRY STRATEGIES].

22.

Director-General's Office, supra note 21; Brundtland, supra note 21, at 1;

TOBACCO INDUSTRY STRATEGIES, supra note 21.

23.

Burden ofDisease, supra note 15. See also infra notes 22-26.

24.

TOBACCO INDUSTRY STRATEGIES, supra note 21, at 1-2.

The available

documents come from Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (Philip Morris), R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company (RJR), Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company (B&W), American
Tobacco Company (ATC), Lorillard Tobacco Company (Lorillard), the Tobacco Institute
(TI), the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR) and the British American Tobacco
Company (BAT). Id. at 2.
25.
Id. See also Marc Kaufman, Negotiator in Global Tobacco Talks Quits,
Official Said to Chafe at Softer U.S. Stands, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at Al
(explaining how the lead official of the U.S. delegation, Thomas E. Novotny, resigned
after the second round of negotiations "rather than argue the case of the new [Bush]
administration on tobacco issues" that included proposals of amendments that would
make certain mandatory steps voluntary, disfavor health warnings in the native
language, and soften restrictions on advertising aimed at children and smoking in
public places).
26.

TOBACCO INDUSTRY STRATEGIES, supra note 21, at 1.

27.

Id.
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Based on economics, the tobacco industry has argued that lower
sales of tobacco cause the loss of thousands of jobs, a decrease in
government revenues, and an increase in illegal activity-especially
smuggling.2 8
However, the World Bank noted that government
intervention through tobacco control is justified due to the unique
characteristics of tobacco consumers. 29 Unlike the average consumer,
many smokers are young and addicted to tobacco, and therefore lack
30
the normal capacity to make rational, self-interested decisions.
Many smokers also lack complete and accurate information about the
3
risks of tobacco consumption. '
The World Bank concluded that tobacco control is very desirable
because even small reductions in a disease burden of such large size
bring highly significant health gains. 32 The World Bank deemed the
tobacco industry's policy arguments to be unpersuasive, given that
new jobs replace old jobs, tobacco taxes empirically increase
government revenues, and tobacco taxes still reduce consumption and
33
increase revenues in places where smuggling is high.
The World Bank, therefore, recommended a "multi-pronged"
approach to tobacco control.3 4 It advised governments to combine
taxes with non-price measures (such as advertising bans),
information measures (such as mass media counter-advertising,
warning labels and research dissemination), and restrictions on
smoking in work and public places. 35 Other recommendations by the
World Bank included widening access to nicotine cessation therapies,
and making sure that tobacco control was prominently considered in
the policies and programs of international agencies, such as the
agencies of the United Nations.3 6 The World Bank specifically
37
requested that international agencies support the WHO's FCTC.

III. THE WHO

AND ITS LEGAL WORK

In the half-century after its establishment in 1948, the WHO
worked on the control of certain infectious diseases, the training of
medical assistants, the implementation of an "essential drugs" policy,
the initiation of primary health care, and the control and treatment of

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Economics of Tobacco Control, supra note 13, at 2.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 6-7, 10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 38
The WHO, however, used its
constitutional
powers
to
propose
legally binding international law
"sparingly. ' 39
Before the FCTC, the WHO's only notable
contributions to binding international law were the International
Health Regulations (IHR), concerning the control of three contagious
40
diseases: cholera, plague, and yellow fever.
The WHO has an amazingly expansive health mandate as a
specialized agency of the United Nations. 4 1 The WHO Constitution
defines its "wide international responsibilities" in the field of health
generally as the "attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
level of health. '42 Health is very broadly defined as "a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity." 43 "All necessary action to attain the

38.
H. Francis Shattuck, Jr. et al., Section Recommendation and Report of the
American Bar Association: III. World Health Organization, 30 INT'L LAW. 686, 688-89
(1996).
39.
Shattuck, supra note 38, at 690. See also David P. Fidler, The Future of the
World Health Organization:What Role for InternationalLaw?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1079, 1089-93 (1998). Article 19 of the WHO Constitution states:
The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. A twothirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the'adoption of such
conventions or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when
accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
WHO CONST. art. 19.

40.
See Fidler, supra note 39, at 1089-90.
The International Health
Regulations were initiated in 1951, were revised twice, and are currently under
revision again. Michelle Forrest, Using the Power of the World Health Organization:
The InternationalHealth Regulations and the Future'ofInternational Health Law, 33
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 154, 162 (2000).
41.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 57, 1; WHO CONST. pmbl.
42.
WHO CONST. art. 1.
43.
See WHO CONST. pmbl. The Preamble also states:
The States Parties to this Constitution declare, in conformity with the Charter
of the United Nations, that the following principles are basic to the happiness,
harmonious relations and security of all peoples:
Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion,
political belief, economic or social condition.
The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and
security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and
States.
The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of health is of
value to all.
Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and
control of disease, especially communicable disease, is a common danger.
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44
objective of the Organization" is within the functions of the WHO.
However, as almost all of the enumerated functions in the WHO
Constitution are administrative, technical, or developmental in
nature, it may not be surprising that the WHO has been more active
in these methods of promoting health rather than in the making of
international health law. 45 The exception to this rule is Article 2(k),
an enumerated function stating that the WHO may "propose
make
and
regulations,
and
agreements
conventions,
recommendations with respect to international health matters and to
perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the Organization
and are consistent with its objective. '46 I
The WHO began to address the issue of tobacco control by
However, as non-binding
issuing resolutions-18 since 1986. 4 7
international law, the resolutions had little effect. 48 In 1996, the
World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO's governing body, passed
49
Resolution 49.17 to begin work on the FCTC.
Reasons for the WHO's restraint from exercising its treaty power
may be numerous. The WHO could have practiced self-restraint to
avoid issues of non-compliance and unenforceability,5 0 to maintain a

Healthy development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to live
harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to such
development.
The extension to all peoples of the benefits of medical, psychological and related
knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of health.
Informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are of the
utmost importance in the improvement of the health of the people.
Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be
fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.
Id.
44.

WHO CONST. art. 2(v).

45.

WHO CONST. art. 2(a)-(v).

WHO CONST. art. 2(k).
46.
47.
Framework Convention Alliance, Action by Governments (June 2001), at
WHO
Free
Initiative,
WHO Tobacco
http://www.fctc.org/actionGOVT.shtml;
Resolutions About Tobacco Control, at http://www.who.int/toh/Library/whoresol.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
48.
Primer, supra note 18, at 4-5 (stating that WHA resolutions have met with
varying degrees of success and that the piecemeal implementation by states is too
informal to be of any major consequence).
49.
WHO Tobacco Free Initiative, International Framework Convention for
Tobacco Control, WHA Res. 49.17 (May 25, 1996), at http://tobacco.who.int/
page.cfm?tld=37 (last visited Nov. 14, 2002). The two other organs of the WHO are the
Executive Board, the executive organ of the WHA, and the Secretariat, which consists
of the Director-General and his staff. WHO CONST. arts. 9-37.
Fidler, supra note 39, at 1090-91. The IHR's global surveillance system
50.
broke down due to Member States who violated agreements both to report required
information about disease outbreaks and not to excessively restrict the traffic of goods
and people from Member States suffering from outbreaks. Id. Neither the WHO's
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conscientiously "apolitical character,"51 to move toward the
development of national public health systems and away from specific
issues, 52 or because of mistaken neglect. 53 The FCTC is now the
WHO's first international health treaty in its half-century history and
the first exercise of its power to propose conventions under Article 19
54
of the WHO Constitution.
The WHO's more active engagement in politics may have been
inevitable at some point, because health concerns are political issues.
For example, environmental problems such as marine pollution,
ozone depletion, desertification, acid rain, destruction of biodiversity,
and trade in hazardous wastes are health issues and political
issues.55 Human rights violations such as governmental denial of
necessary medical assistance to individuals, subjection of people to
compulsory health measures or torture, and other physical abuses are
56
similar examples.
Political conflicts occur especially when health concerns interfere
with trade. The trade in tobacco today has been compared to the
opium trade with China in the early 1900s and the early trade of
alcohol to Africa. 57 In the future, trade conflicts with health are
likely to arise with issues such as the standards for the safety, purity,
and potency of biological and pharmaceutical products; the regulation
of the trade of blood and human organs; the trade of health
information, services, and products over the Internet; and the
58
protection of the intellectual property of pharmaceutical companies.
Globalization and the growth of international law may also have
made the timing for the WHO's action ripe. As the scope of
international law broadens beyond the traditional international law
issues of diplomacy, trade, and war to include human rights and

Constitution nor the JHR provide the WHO with enforcement powers when rules are
violated. Id.
51.
Shattuck, supra note 38, at 692.
52.
Id. at 690.
53.
See Fidler, supra note 39, at 1099-1103.
54.
See Primer,supra note 18, at 3. See also WHO CONST. art. 19. Article 19
reads:
The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. A twothirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such
conventions or agreements, which shall come into force for each Member when
accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
WHO CONST. art. 19.

55.
Fidler, supra note 39, at 1097-98.
56.
See id. at 1122-23.
57.
Matt Parker, Blowing Smoke? A Reappraisal of U.S. Tobacco Policy in
China,21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 211, 212 (2000).
58.
Fidler, supra note 39, at 1109-10.
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consensus

59
This
regarding health law becomes more and more probable.
the
WHO's
to
have
contributed
may
growth in international law
decision to use international law to achieve its objectives by creating
the FCTC.
technical
as
providing
means-such
Politically-neutral

assistance,

creating

standard

classifications,

coordinating

international efforts, and providing emergency and humanitarian
60
The tobacco
relief used in other circumstances-can only go so far.
industry has not hesitated to use legal and political means-and even
61
If the WHO does
illegal means-to promote the tobacco business.
not actively use legal and political means, then the WHO will be
reacting to the legislation of tobacco companies and its apolitical
stance will function as a self-imposed straightjacket on its own efforts
to promote health. 62 Therefore, as the WHO moves from neutrality
toward complaint and law-making, the WHO should also think about
ways to defend the FCTC from attack through international

adjudication.

IV.

THE SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE OF THE

FCTC

The FCTC is a framework convention, which is a different name
for a treaty. 6 3 Unlike a resolution, for example, a treaty and a
convention are legally binding. 64 The FCTC was sketched by the
Working Group of the FCTC and then negotiated by the

See id. at 1094, 1118.
59.
Shattuck, supra note 38, at 689-92.
60.
TOBACCO INDUSTRY STRATEGIES, supra note 21; UK Tobacco Firm Targets
61.
African Youth, supra note 1.
TOBACCO INDUSTRY STRATEGIES, supra note 21, at 7. For example, one
62.
tobacco industry consultant proposed that the industry try to "mitigate the impact" of
the WHO's policy against tobacco in the Third World "by pushing them [sic] into a more
objective and neutral position." Id.
Primer, supra note 18, at 4. "A treaty is an international legal agreement
63.
concluded between States in written form, and governed by international law." Id. A
framework convention is a type of treaty that usually involves more general
obligations. Id. A protocol usually "supplements, clarifies, amends or qualifies an
Id.
"A
existing international agreement" (typically a framework convention).
resolution is an expression of common interest of numerous states in specific areas of
international cooperation." Id.
Id. Regulations, such as the IHR, are legally binding as well. However, the
64.
WHO's regulation power under Article 21 is limited to five specific areas, whereas the
WHO's convention power under Article 19 contains no similar restriction. See WHO
CONST. arts. 19, 21. Article 21 gives the WHO regulation authority concerning
sanitary and quarantine requirements, nomenclatures, diagnostic standards,
standards with respect to safety, purity, and potency, and product advertising and
labeling. WHO CONST. art. 21. For the text of Article 19, see note 54.
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Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) of the FCTC in four
sessions. 6 5 A fifth round was held October 14, 2002 through October
The FCTC and its possible related protocols are
25, 2002.66
scheduled for adoption in May 2003.67
A. The Substance of the FCTC
The

FCTC remains

under negotiation. 68

Its

substantive

65.
See Secretariat Update: Provisional Timetable, supra note 19. The first
session of the INB was held October 16, 2000 through October 21, 2000; the second
session was held April 30, 2001 through May 5, 2001; the third session was held
November 22, 2001 through November 28, 2001. Timetable, supra note 19. An
18-23, 2002.
additional fourth session of negotiations met from March
List of Documents Available, at
Negotiating
Body,
Intergovernmental
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/E/E_inb4.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). The World Health
Assembly (WHA), an organ of the WHO, established a Working Group and an
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) for the FCTC by resolution in WHA 52.18.
WHO CONST. art. 9(a); WHO, Method of Work, at 1, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB1/4 (Sept.
5, 2000), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/inb1/PDFinbl/elinb4.pdf. The WHA gave the
INB further direction in WHA 53.16. Method of Work, supra. The Working Group's
meetings included "representatives from 153 Member States (representing 95% of the
world's population) ... as well as observers from the Holy See, Palestine, organizations
of the United Nations system" and non-governmental organizations. WHO Tobacco
Free Initiative, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at http://tobacco.who.int/
page.cfm?pid=40 (last visited Oct. 15, 2002). "The Intergovernmental Negotiating Body
is open to participation by all WHO Member States, regional economic integration
organizations, and observers." WHO Tobacco Free Initiative, Intergovernmental
NegotiatingBody, at http://tobacco.who.int/page.cfm?sid=36 (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
The WHO has 191 Member States and 2 Associate Members (Puerto Rico and Tokelau)
as of May 1, 1998 (46 African, 36 from the Americas, 22 Eastern Mediterranean, 51
European, 10 South East Asian, and 28 Western Pacific States). WHO, Member States
of the World Health Organization (as at 21 October 2002), at http://www3.who.int/
whosis/member states/memberstates.cfm?path=whosis,member states&language=en
glish (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
66.
Secretariat Update: Provisional Timetable, supra note 19; Timetable, supra
note 19.
67.
SecretariatUpdate: ProvisionalTimetable, supra note 19.
68.
WHO, New Chair's Text of a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB5/2 (June 25, 2002), at http://www.who.int/go/fctc/E/E-inb5.htm
[hereinafter New Chair's Text, INB5]. The following is an outline of the current
working text:
Preamble
PART I:

INTRODUCTION
Art. 1:

Use of terms

Art. 2:

Relationship between this Convention
agreements and legal instruments

PART II: OBJECTIVE,
OBLIGATIONS
Art. 3:

GUIDING

Objective

PRINCIPLES

AND

and

other

GENERAL
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Art. 4:

Guiding principles

General obligations
PART III: MEASURES RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF DEMAND FOR
TOBACCO
Price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco
Art. 6:
Art. 5:

Art. 8:

Non-price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco
Protection from passive smoking

Art. 9:
Art. 10:

Regulation of contents of tobacco products
Regulation of tobacco product disclosures

Art. 11:

Packaging and labeling of tobacco products
Education, communication, training and public awareness

Art. 7:

Art. 12:

promotion

and

sponsorship

Art. 13:

Advertising,
products

Art. 14:

measures
reduction
Demand
dependence and cessation

of

concerning

tobacco
tobacco

PART IV: MEASURES RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF THE SUPPLY
OF TOBACCO
Art. 15:

Illicit trade in tobacco products

Art. 16:

Sales to minors

Art. 17:

Elimination of tobacco subsidies and provision of
government support for other economically viable activities

PART V: PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Art. 18:

Protection of the environment

PART VI: LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
Art. 19:

Liability and compensation

COOPERATION AND
PART VII: SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION
Art. 20: Research, surveillance, monitoring and exchange of
information
Art. 21:

Reporting and exchange of information

Art. 22:

Cooperation in the scientific, technical and legal fields and
provision of related expertise

PART VIII:
RESOURCES

INSTITUTIONAL

Art. 23:

ARRANGEMENTS

AND

FINANCIAL

Conference of the Parties

Art. 24:

Secretariat

Art. 25:

Relations between the Conference of the Parties and
competent international and regional intergovernmental
organizations

Art. 26:

Financial resources

PART IX: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Art. 27:

Settlement of disputes

PART X: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONVENTION
Art. 28:

Amendments to this Convention

20021

THE FUTURE OF INTERNA TIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL

1743

provisions include tobacco price and tax measures, the regulation of
content and packaging, and disclosures to reduce the demand for
tobacco, as well as measures regarding subsidies, smuggling, and
sales to minors to reduce the supply of tobacco. 69 Related measures
and
licensing,
sponsorships,
promotion,
advertising,
cover
70
under
is
still
However, as the FCTC
information exchange.
negotiation, many terms of the FCTC remain undecided. 71 Less
controversial sections dealing with customary procedures for, the
72
development of the Convention and its final clauses have settled.
Parties still have yet to reach consensus on key issues such as the
non-price measures to reduce the demand for tobacco-especially
packaging and labeling-and measures providing for compensation
73
and liability-particularly the liability of tobacco companies.
Countries such as Japan want the complete deletion of some of these
provisions. 74

Art. 29:

Adoption and amendment of annexes to this Convention

PART XI: FINAL PROVISIONS
Art. 30:

Reservations

Art. 31:

Withdrawal

Art. 32:

Right to vote

Art. 33:

Protocols

Art. 34:

Signature

Art. 35:

Ratification, acceptance, approval, formal confirmation or
accession

Art. 36:

Entry into force

Art. 37:

Depositary

Art. 38: Authentic texts
69.
Id.
WHO, Division of Responsibilities Among Working Groups, WHO Doc.
70.
A/FCTC/INB2/DIV/6 (Apr. 30, 2001), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctclinb2/PDFinb2/
einb2d6.pdf.
WHO, Drafting and Negotiation of the WHO Framework Co'nvention on
71.
Tobacco Control: Textual Proposalsand Definitions Submitted for the New Chairs Text
by 15 May 2002, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB5/3 (Aug. 5, 2002), at http:lwww.who.intl
gb/fctc/ PDF/inb5/einb53.pdf [hereinafter Drafting and Negotiation of the WHO FCTC,
INB5I. For previous diafts, see WHO, Co-Chairs' Working Papers: Final Revisions,
Working Group 2, at 1, WHO Doc. AIFCTC/INB4/2(a) (Jan. 24, 2002), at
http:/lwww.who.int/gblfctclinb4/PDFinb4/einb42a.pdf [hereinafter WG2 Co-Chairs'
Working Papers:Final Revisions]; WHO, Co-Chairs' Working Papers: Final Revisions,
Working Group 3, at 1, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB4/2(b) (Jan. 24, 2002), at
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/inb4/PDFinb4/einb42b.pdf.
Draftingand Negotiation of the WHO FCTC, INB5, supra note 71, at 17-18.
72.
Id. at 4-10, 12-15.
73.
Id. at 2, 13.
74.
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Overall, as it might be expected, the substance of the FCTC has
grown less demanding as the drafts have been negotiated. 75 Early
drafts generally provided mandatory language, such as "shall", in
Subsequent drafts began adding qualifying
their provisions. 76
language, such as "shall endeavor to," "to the extent possible," "as
appropriate," and "in accordance with its capabilities and national
law" to provisions, particularly with respect to contested areas such
77
as packaging and labeling.
Significantly, the definition of the FCTC's rules with relation to
international trade, one of the FCTC's guiding principles that had
78
been debated in previous sessions, appears to be near agreement.
In earlier negotiations, proposed principles relating the FCTC's
measures to international trade rules ranged from clearly prioritizing
the tobacco control measures over other international agreements,
requiring that health measures be in accord with "existing
international obligations," or requiring that measures not be
"arbitrary or unjustified" means of trade discrimination. 79 The
FCTC, as it now stands, seems to be in favor of requiring that tobacco
control measures will not result in "arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination" in international trade. 80 This refers to familiar
language in international trade law, namely the language found in
81
the chapeau of the general exceptions to GATT under Article XX.
Part VI of this Note addresses the relationship of GATT's exceptions
to the FCTC.
B. The Procedures of the FCTC
The present draft of the FCTC has clarified procedural questions
from earlier drafts. For example, the FCTC presently provides that
parties cannot make reservations to the FCTC, which had not been
addressed in earlier drafts.82 A reservation is a unilateral statement

WHO, ProvisionalTexts of Proposed Draft Elements for a WHO Framework
75.
Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/WG2/3 (Feb. 29, 2000), at
http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/E/E-wg2.htm; New Chair's Text, INB5, supra note 68.
76.
See sources cited supra note 75.
77.
Id.
78.
WG2 Co.Chairs' Working Papers: Final Revisions, supra note 71, at 3-7;
Draftingand Negotiation of the WHO FCTC, INB5, supra note 71, at 2-3.
WG2 Co-Chairs' Working Papers FinalRevisions, supra note 71, at 3-7.
79.
Draftingand Negotiation of the WHO FCTC, INB5, supra note 71, at 2-3.
80.
81.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
New Chair's Text, INB5, supra note 68, at 20. For previous versions of
82.
FCTC procedures, see WHO, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Textual
Proposals with Respect to Article J (Compensation and Liability), Article S
(Development of the Convention), and Article T (Final clauses), at 8-10, WHO Doc.
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to the
by a state that allows it to exclude or modify certain provisions
83
treaty as applied to that state while accepting a treaty.
Generally, reservations are acceptable as long as they are not
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.8 4 In the
When
majority of treaties, reservations are generally minor.8 5
reservations are more substantive, they may govern important issues
such as dispute settlement.8 6 In areas such as human rights, for
therefore,
example, reservations have been highly substantive 8and,
7
reservations could have been substantive in the FCTC.
The present FCTC also provides a stricter "out" for states by
requiring them to withdraw from the FCTC after written notice and
three years, instead of one year as in an earlier draft.8 8 When a party
withdraws from a treaty, the treaty is no longer binding on that
89
party.
Article 27 covers the settlement of disputes over the FCTC. 90
Article 27 retains the emphasis on negotiation and mediation of its
predecessor, Article R, but adds an interesting feature. 91 Article R
suggested options such as mediation by a third party, compulsory
arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the
FCTC's Conference of the Parties, or submission to a conciliation
committee. 92 A later version of Article R suggested a provision
stating that "the FCTC shall take priority" in the case of conflict
between the FCTC and the application of another international
agreement, such as a trade agreement. 93 Instead, Article 27 prov[des:
"This Article does not preclude the application of the dispute

AIFCTC/INB3/5 (Oct. 19, 2001), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/inb3[PDFinb3/elinb35.pdf
[hereinafter Textual Proposals with Respect to Articles J, S, and TI.

83.

WHO, Elements of a WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at

31, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/WG1/6 (Sept. 8, 1999), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/
wgl/PDFwg1/elt6.pdf [hereinafter Elements of a WHO FCTC].
84.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 19(3), 115 U.N.T.S. 332, 8 I.L.M. 679.
85.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 488 (Lori F. Damrosch et al.

eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW].
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
New Chair's Text, INB5, supra note 68, at 20; Textual Proposals with
Respect to Articles J, S, and T, supra note 82, at 8-10.
89.
Elements of a WHO FCTC, supra note 83, at 31.
90.
New Chair's Text, INB5, supra note 68, at 18.
91.
Id.; WHO, Chair's Text of a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at
13, WHO Doc. AIFCTC/INB2/2 (Jan. 9, 2001), at http://www.who.intlgb/fctc/PDF/inb2
e2inb2.pdf [hereinafter INB2 Chair's Text].
92.
INB2 Chair's Text, supra note 91, at 13.
93.
WHO, Co-Chairs' Working Paper: Inventory of Textual Proposals Made at
the Second Session of the Intergovernmental NegotiatingBody, Merged with the Chair's
Text, at 22, WHO Doc. AIFCTC/INB3/2(c) (July 25, 2001), at http:l/www.who.int/gb/fctc/
PDF/inb3/einb32c.pdf.
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settlement provisions of any other treaty in force between two or
more of the Parties in relation to disputes covered by those
provisions." In contrast to the solution proposed in the prior version
of Article R, this provision anticipates dispute settlement under other
treaties, such as the WTO's dispute settlement system.
Early in the FCTC's first session of negotiations, concerns were
expressed about the relationship between international trade and
tobacco law. 94 Parties suggested that the text should clarify the
relationship between the convention and other international
agreements. 95 Parties also suggested that developing countries
should be protected from the effects of international trade in tobacco,
and that developed countries exporting tobacco should be accountable
96
to them.
However, the present FCTC shows no signs of taking any of
these proposals very seriously. 97 Any clarification of the FCTC's
98
relationship to other treaties has been more implied than express.
Developing countries have not been provided special mention or
protection, and the liability of tobacco companies is still very
contested. 99
In the event that the FCTC causes a debate about its provisions
that negotiation between the parties cannot solve, they may bring
their dispute to an international court.

V. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE WHO

A. InternationalDispute Settlement
Negotiation remains the primary means for the prevention and
settlement of disputes between states. Legal methods do not provide
certain valuable benefits to states, such as privacy, cost effectiveness,
more control by the parties, and the avoidance of "winner-loser"
situations. 10 0 On the other hand, diplomatic methods have been

94.
WHO, Proposed Draft Elements for a WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control: Provisional Texts with Comments of the Working Group, at 3, WHO
Doc. A/FCTC/INB1/2 (July 26, 2000), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/inb1/
elinb2.pdf.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
New Chair'sText, INB5, supra note 68.
97.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES AND LESSONS
100.
FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 29, 31 (Friedl
Weiss ed., 2000) [hereinafter IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES].
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criticized as being too power-oriented and less sensitive to the merits
of the dispute.' 0 1 Legal means may protect weaker actors against
power-politics and unworthy claims by stronger actors.1 02 Other
methods of dispute resolution include arbitration and judicial
l0 3
settlement by domestic courts.
B. The InternationalJudicialSystem
International courts vary widely in terms of size, continuity,
jurisdiction, standing, applicable law and procedure, binding aspect of
outcomes, and composition of judges. 10 4 The Benelux Court of Justice
admits a very small number of Member States while the "principal
judicial organ" of the United Nations, the International Court of
The
Justice (ICJ), has jurisdiction of universal scope.' 05
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea decides cases in
accordance with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, while
the International Criminal Court applies international criminal and
humanitarian law.' 0 6
The ICJ is the classic international court and the United
Nations' principal judicial organ.' 0 7 Permanence, creation by an
international legal instrument, use of international law, use of preexisting procedure, and legally binding outcomes characterize the
08
ICJ.'
The most significant restriction on cases before the ICJ is
that the parties must be states.'0 9 The ICJ also offers advisory
opinions at the request of any: body authorized by the UN Charter to
make such a request, such as the WHO. 110
C. The WHO as a Party Before the ICJ
Currently, the WHO has no judicial body of its own."'

Id. at 29.
101.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 31.
104.
PICT Research Matrix, at http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/Matrix.htm
visited Nov. 13, 2002).

105.

The

(last

See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferationof InternationalJudicialBodies:

The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 709, 713 (1999); PICT Research
Matrix Introduction, at http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/matrixintro.html (last visited
Nov. 13, 2002); PICT Research Matrix, supra note 104.
PICT Research Matrix, supra note 104.
106.
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 86, at 820; Statute of the International
107.
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter, ICJ
Statute].
108. Romano, supranote 105, at 713-14.
109. ICJ Statute, supra note 107, art. 34, cl.1.
ICJ Statute, supra note 107, art. 65.
110.
111.

See generally WHO CONST. arts. 9-37.
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WHO Constitution provides that disputes about the interpretation of
the WHO Constitution not settled by negotiation or by the WHA will
be referred to the ICJ unless the parties agree otherwise. 112 Thus,
states could use the ICJ to rule on a dispute over a WHO treaty such
as the FCTC.
The WHO has exercised its power to request an advisory opinion
from the ICJ on two occasions. 113 In 1980, during political tension in
the Middle East, the WHO wanted to know whether the transfer of
its Egypt office to Jordan would violate a 1951 agreement with Egypt
that contained a requirement of two-years notice (Egypt case). 114 In
1986, the WHO questioned the legality of nuclear weapons use under
international law and under the WHO Constitution (Nuclear
Weapons case). 115 Both cases suggest that the WHO belief that the
ICJ might support the WHO in a politically difficult dispute and that
the ICJ intended to show the WHO that it was clearly mistaken.
The Egypt case and the Nuclear Weapons case demonstrate the
WHO's effort to resolve politically difficult questions through the
international judicial system. In the Egypt case, the WHO wanted to
move its Egypt office due to the increasingly tense situation in the
Middle East after the 1978 Camp David Agreement. 116 The ICJ
issued an advisory opinion deciding that the parties were required to
"consult together in good faith" and to give each other reasonable
notice in the event of a transfer, but refrained from actually deciding
the question of whether the 1951 notice provision applied to the
117
WHO's transfer from Egypt.
The Egypt case demonstrated that the WHO could not expect the
ICJ to definitively decide a politically-sensitive question before it,
even when the ICJ was being asked to do traditional judicial work
involving treaty interpretation. 118 Dissenting, Judge Morozov argued
that that the ICJ should not have issued an opinion at all, because
the dispute had the type of political character that the Court should
avoid handling. 119 However, the WHO again exercised its advisory

112.
WHO CONST. art. 75.
International Court of Justice, Case Summary, Interpretation of the
113.
Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion of 20
December 1980, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iwhomessummary
801220.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Summary: Egypt Agreement];
International Court of Justice, Case Summary, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear
Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ianw'gummary960708.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2002) [hereinafter Summary: Nuclear Weapons].
114.
Summary: Egypt Agreement, supra note 113.
115.
Summary: Nuclear Weapons, supra note 113.
Summary: Egypt Agreement, supra note 113 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
116.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
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opinion power in the more politically troublesome Nuclear Weapons
case, where the ICJ echoed Judge Morozov's concern.120
The Nuclear Weapons case was the first case ever in which the
ICJ refused the request for an advisory opinion from a specialized
agency of the United Nations. 121 The ICJ held that the WHO was
authorized to request the advisory opinion and that the requested
opinion was indeed on a legal question. 122 However, the Court
refused the request because the legal question did not arise within
123
the scope of the activities of the WHO.
The ICJ reasoned that in light of the context, object, and purpose
of the WHO Constitution, the WHO was competent to address and
request opinions regarding measures to remedy negative effects on
health, but not to challenge the legality of the causes of such
effects. 124 The Court relied on the principle of speciality that limits
the scope of international organizations. 1 25 The Court relied on the
structure of the U.N. system, in which the United Nations is vested
with powers of general scope, while autonomous subsidiary
126
organizations, such as the WHO, are vested with sectorial powers.
The Court argued that questions regarding the use of force and the
regulation of armament and disarmament are within the competence
of the United Nations-not within the competence of specialized
127
agencies.
The ICJ voted to deny the request to interpret the legality of
nuclear weapons as violations of international law and of the WHO
Constitution.128 As ICJ Judge Oda wrote, the advisory function is to
be used to resolve specific cases of conflict, not general matters of
international law. 129 Judge Oda also noted that the WHO's request
was drafted without agreement among the delegates in the WHA, and
also noted that the WHO's legal counsel had repeatedly objected to
bringing the request before the ICJ on the grounds that the 'WHO
13 0
was not competent to bring the matter to the court.
The WHO learned that international courts cannot be expected
to decide political, rather than legal, issues. The Egypt and Nuclear
Weapons cases demonstrated that neither the ICJ nor any
international court can rubberstamp mere policy. Therefore, clearly,

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Summary: Nuclear Weapons, supra note 113.
Id. (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the FCTC's success depends on its ability to stand on its own as
13 1
binding international law among other binding international laws.

VI. THE WTO's DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

The ICJ's general international law jurisdiction seems to make
the ICJ an appropriate place to resolve international conflicts
between trade and non-trade interests.1 2 However, these types of
international trade conflicts have more often been brought before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Panels and Appellate Body
(AB). 133 The compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO's dispute settlement
l 4
system is the primary source of its popularity.'
Like the ICJ, the WTO courts only decide cases where the
parties are states.' 3 5 Unlike the ICJ and other international courts,
however, the WTO exercises compulsory jurisdiction over contending
parties; its judgments can be enforced through trade sanctions if the
other party fails to comply. 136 The WTO dispute settlement system
also differs in that it has two tiers: the DSB acts as the usual factfinding court of first resort, and the AB hears appeals from DSB
137
decisions.
The current WTO dispute settlement system should be
distinguished from the panels that preceded it under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 138 Before the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations
that created the WTO dispute settlement system in 1994, the GATT
panels heard trade complaints brought under GATT since 1947.139
However, the earlier GATT panels were characterized more by
diplomacy than by procedure, and frequently veered from the text of
the treaty and imposed arbitrary tests when interpreting, for
140
example, the environmental exceptions to GATT.
With the creation of the WTO dispute settlement system in 1994,
the DSB was given more procedural and legal substance, and the AB

131.

See infra Part III.

132.

IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES, supra note 100, at 42.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 41.
Id.
PICT Research Matrix, supra note 104.
Julie H. Paltrowitz, A "Greening"of the World Trade Organization? A Case

Comment on the Asbestos Report, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1789, 1796 (2001).

137.
Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO
Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563,
567-68 (2000).
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 568-69.
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was created to hear appeals from DSB panel decisions. 141 The new
rules adopted a single source of procedure for resolving disputes, the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and endorsed the use of
customary rules of interpretation of international law, such as the
142
ordinary meaning rule of the widely-respected Vienna Convention.
Further, the new system promoted more-informed decisions and
freedom from political partiality by requiring panelists and members
of the AB to possess more experience, such as "demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the
covered agreements [(GATT)] generally" and the prohibition of the
143
selection of panelists from the disputing states.
As commentators have noted, there has been a change in the
1 44
WTO jurisprudence, as well as a structural change in the WTO.
Tobacco control proponents remain very wary of the WTO because of
the weak reasoning in the old GATT decisions, and because of newer
WTO decisions from the DSB and AB that ultimately found that the
challenged domestic environmental measures violated GATT. 145 As
discussed below, the newer WTO cases rejected the trade violations,
not the environmental purposes behind the measures. 146
The
decisions left open the possibility that a properly-executed
environmental measure could prevail over the ability of states to
trade without restriction, as seen in the cases discussed below.147
A. FCTC Measures as Exceptions to GATT's Rules Against Trade
Restrictions
Disputes before the WTO bodies originate from a violation of
some trade agreement, usually GATT.148 Under GATT, for example,
domestic products and foreign imports should receive the same
treatment, and imports should not be subject to quantitative
restrictions, quotas, or total bans. 149 A State with a trade-restrictive
measure would defend its measure by arguing that it fit into one of
150
the general exceptions allowed under GATT's Article XX.

141.
Id.
142.
Id.; INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 85, at 507.
143.
Wofford, supra note 137, at 569-71.
144.
See Paltrowitz, supra note 136; Wofford, supranote 137.
145.
San Francisco Tobacco Free Project, How Might the WTO Impact the
FCTC?, at http://sftfc.globalink.org/wtoimpact.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
146.,
Wofford, supra note 137,.at 575.
147.
See infra Parts VI.B.-E.
148.
Laura Yavitz, The World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products,Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43, 47 (2002).
149.
Id.; GATT arts. 1, 111, XI.
150.
Yavitz, supranote 148, at 48.
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Presently, the FCTC only requires that domestic tobacco control
measures be "effective legislative, executive, administrative, or other
measures," in addition to prohibiting the free distribution of tobacco
products. 151 Almost all of the FCTC's key provisions have become
increasingly permissive. 152 For example, the second session of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) drafted Articles 1.8
through 1.12 of the FCTC, eliminating youth tobacco sales without
qualification. 1 53 The first sentence of Article 1.8 read, "Each Party
shall prohibit tobacco sales to persons under the age of 18."' 154 Later
proposals to the text of Article 1.8 included qualifiers that remain in
the present Article 16: "Each Party shall [take appropriate measures
to] prohibit tobacco sales [and supply] to [persons under the age of 18]
/ [minors as determined by domestic law]."'1 55 States still retain
substantial autonomy in choosing the type of tobacco control
measures to adopt under the FCTC.

Although the terms of the FCTC are still unsettled, the WTO's
trade rules and exceptions have been established. Any domestic
tobacco control measure must meet the requirements for exceptions
listed under Article XX. 156 Article XX contains an introduction, or
chapeau, and lists ten specific exceptions to GATT. 157 The chapeau to
Article XX reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discriminationbetween countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures [within the following ten
exceptions].1

58

Of the ten exceptions, the exceptions commonly cited, particularly in
environmental and health disputes, are Articles XX(b), XX(d), and

151.
New Chair's Text, INB5, supra note 68.
152.
Id. Compare WHO, Revised Co-Chairs' Conference Papers from Working
Group 1 During the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body, at 8-9,
WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB4/5 (Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/
inb4/PDFinb4/einb45a.pdf [hereinafter Revised Co-Chairs' Conference Papers from
WG1 During INB3], with INB2 Chair's Text, supra note 91, at 3, 6-8, and WHO, CoChairs' Working Paper: Inventory of Textual Proposals Made at the Second Session of
the IntergovernmentalNegotiating Body, Merged with the Chair's Text: Working Group
2, at 7-15, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB3/2(b) (July 25, 2001), at http://www.who.int/gb/
fctc.PDF/inb3/einb32b.pdf.
153.
INB2 Chair's Text, supra note 91, at 7.
154.
Id.
155.
Revised Co-Chairs' Conference Papers from WG1 During INB3, supra note
1512, at 8; New Chair's Text, INB5, supra note 68, at 11.
156.
GATT art. XX.
157.
Id.
158.
Id. (emphasis added).
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XX(g), that protect domestic measures:
(b)necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement .....
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
159
domestic production or consumption.

Although no formal requirement that the WTO bodies must be
constrained by precedent exists, the DSB Panels and the AB in fact
refer to the reasoning of earlier cases and rely on such reasoning
when deciding cases. 160 As noted above, the AB also interprets
treaties according to the Vienna Convention rule that "a treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose."'1 61 By applying this general rule of
interpretation, the AB formed a two-tiered test for Article XX
163
162
Asbestos, 164
exceptions in its decisions in the Gasoline, Shrimp,
166
65
and Shrimp Compliance cases.
The AB established the two-tiered Article XX test in Gasoline,
analyzed the specific exception most relevant to the FCTC-Article
XX(b)'s health exception-in Asbestos, and expanded on the elements
of the second step in Shrimp and Shrimp Compliance.16 7 In Gasoline,
the AB stated that the burden of proving an Article XX exception
rested on the party invoking the exception, and established the
following test: 1) the challenged measure must fit into one of Article
XX's ten specific exceptions, and 2) the measure must meet the
requirements of the Article XX chapeau.168

159.
Wofford, supra note 137, at 566-67.
160.
Id. at 590.
161.
See sources cited supra note 142; WTO Report of the Appellate Body:
United
States-Standards
For Reformulated And
Conventional
Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603, 620-21 [hereinafter GasolineAB Report].
162.
Gasoline AB Report, supra note 161, at 626.
163.
WTO Report of the Appellate Body: United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 118,
152 [hereinafter Shrimp AB Report].
164.
WTO Report of the Appellate Body: European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/ABR (Mar. 12,
2001), 2001 WL 256081, at *43 [hereinafter Asbestos AB Report].
165.
WTO Report of the Appellate Body: United States-Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001), 2001 WL 1261572, at *23.35 [hereinafter
Shrimp Compliance AB Report].
166.
Wofford, supranote 137, at 585.
167.
Gasoline AB Report, supra note 161; Shrimp AB Report, supra note 162;
Asbestos AB Report, supra note 163; Shrimp Compliance AB Report, supra note 165.
168.
Gasoline AB Report, supra note 161, at 626-27.
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As the AB noted, the first step of the test is easier than the
second. 169 Generalizing the AB's analysis of Article XX(g), a domestic
measure would fit into a specific exception and pass the first prong of
the exceptions test when a balanced reading of the words of the
specific exception that was neither too expansive nor too emasculated,
and case-by-case scrutiny of the factual and legal context of the
170
measure, revealed that the measure fit the specific exception.
The AB carefully distinguished the requirements of the chapeau
from the other substantive rules of GATT as a "further and separate"
question not collapsible into any other issue. 17 1 The AB found that
the chapeau's purpose was to prevent the abuse of the exceptions to
defeat substantive rules of GATT (relying on the drafting history of
Article XX), that the . particular exceptions must be applied
reasonably with due regard to the legal duties and rights of the
parties, and that the chapeau asks less about the specific contents of
the measure, but more about the manner in which the measure is
172
applied.
B. The Gasoline AB Report
In Gasoline, the challenged measure was a U.S. law-an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation known as the
Gasoline Rule-that established certain baseline levels of permissible
pollutants for domestic and foreign producers of gasoline, purportedly
to reduce air pollution in the United States. 173 Venezuela, and later
Brazil, challenged the assignment of the statutory baseline to
imported gasoline, arguing that the statutory baseline was stricter
than the individual baselines given to domestic producers who were
in operation for more than six months in 1990.174 The United States
appealed the DSB Panel's denial of the applicability of Article XX(g),
but did not challenge the Panel's findings that the exceptions in
175
Articles XX(b) and XX(d) did not apply.
When the AB pointed out that the United States could have
offered the option of individual baseline pollution levels to Venezuela
and Brazil, as well as domestic producers, or created some other
identical measure, the United States argued that the verification and

169.
Id. at 622.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 627. To do otherwise would be to "empty the chapeau of its contents
and to deprive the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to () of meaning." Id.
172.
Id. at 629.

173.

Id.

at

606;

WTO,

Venezuela,

http://www.wto.int/english/tratop-e/envir

Brazil

versus

US:

Gasoline, at

e/edisO7_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).

174.

Venezuela, Brazil versus US: Gasoline, supra note 173.

175.

Gasoline AB Report, supra note 161, at 613.
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enforcement of individual baselines for foreign producers was too
"impracticable" and difficult for the EPA. Further, the United States
argued that the domestic application of the statutory baseline would
have been "physically and financially impossible" given the
magnitude of changes that would be required in almost all U.S.
1 76
refineries'
The AB agreed with the DSB Panel and found that the U.S.
arguments were unpersuasive. 177 The United States did not show
that its usual techniques and procedures for determining the origin
and tracking of international goods were inadequate to make foreign
trade data here sufficiently reliable, as it was in other contexts such
as in the enforcement of anti-dumping laws. 178 Moreover, the AB
inferred from the U.S.'s lack of knowledge about the possibility of
cooperation with foreign refinery and government cooperation that
the United States failed to explore cooperation with foreign producers
before asserting the impossibility of individual baselines for foreign
gasoline. 179 Further, the AB compared U.S. recognition of the
domestic difficulty in applying the statutory baseline with the U.S.
practice in requiring foreign producers to abide by the statutory
baseline. The AB found that the United States had not accorded
equivalent consideration to foreign producers of gasoline when
requiring them to abide by the stricter standard. 180 Because of these
two omissions, theAB held that although the Gasoline Rule related to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and, therefore, fell
under Article XX(g), the United States violated the Article XX
chapeau's prohibitions on "unjustifiable discrimination" and
"disguised restriction on international trade.' 181 Therefore, the
measure failed the second part of the two-tiered test.
The AB declared that the three elements in the chapeau"arbitrary discrimination,"
"unjustified
discrimination,"
and
"disguised restriction" on international trade-were to be read "sideby-side."'18 2
The AB reasoned that "arbitrary and unjustified
discrimination" contained elements in common with "disguised
restriction.1 83 "Disguised restriction" was broader than "concealed or
unannounced" discrimination in international trade, and that it could
include restrictions amounting to "arbitrary and unjustified

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 632.
Id. at 631-33.
Id. at 631.
Id.

180.

Id.

181.
182.

Id. at 632-33.
Id. at 627.

183.

Id.
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discrimination.' 18 4 In Shrimp and Shrimp Compliance, the AB
differentiated
"unjustified
discrimination"
from
"arbitrary
discrimination," but offered no further analysis of the contents of
18 5
"disguised restriction.
C. The Asbestos AB Report
In Asbestos, Canada, the second largest producer and world's
leading exporter of white asbestos, appealed a DSB Panel holding
that a decree by the Prime Minister of France banning "the
manufacture, import, domestic marketing, exportation, possession for
sale, offer, sale and transfer" of all varieties of asbestos fibres for the
protection of consumers and a similar ban for the protection of
workers was justified under the Article XX(b) exception. 186 France
was Canada's biggest European consumer of asbestos, importing
30,000 metric tons per year. i8 7 The European Union estimated that
2,000 people in France died each year from cancer caused by asbestos
88
exposure.1
Canada chose to appeal the first step of the two-tiered test-the
Article XX(b) exception for health-rather than the purportedly moredifficult second step involving the Article XX chapeau.' 8 9 Canada
advanced four arguments against the "necessity" of the decree to
protect life or health under the Article XX(b) exception in the first
part of the two-step exceptions test. 190 First, Canada argued that the
chrysotile asbestos products did not pose a risk to human health. 191
Second, Canada argued that the DSB Panel should be required to
"quantify" the risk of asbestos, and not rely on the "hypotheses" of the
French authorities. 192 Third, Canada argued that the Decree would
not serve its purpose in halting the health risks of asbestos because
193
substitutes for asbestos also posed health risks yet to be defined.
Fourth, Canada argued that the DSB Panel should have found that
the "controlled use" of asbestos was a reasonably available alternative
194
to the Decree.

184.
Id. at 629.
185.
Shrimp AB Report, supra note 163, at 161-74; Shrimp Compliance AB
Report, supra note 165.
186.
Paltrowitz, supra note 136, at 1816-18, 1826.
187.
Id. at 1817.
188.
Id.
189.
Asbestos AB Report, supra note 164, at *46, 1 164.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
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The AB rejected each of these assertions. 195 Upholding the
Panel's finding that the decree protected human life or health from a
health risk, the AB found expert, scientific support for the Panel's
finding that asbestos created a human health risk, and found no
evidence to show that the Panel had abused its discretion in
evaluating the evidence. 196 In addressing the measure's "necessity,"
the AB again dismissed Canada's claim of insufficient evidence,
finding "more than sufficient" evidence to prove that chrysotile
197
asbestos products posed a "significant" risk to human life or health.
The AB stated that the Article XX(b) exception did not require that
the risk be quantified, but that the risk to human health could be
evaluated in quantitative or qualitative terms. 198 The AB found that
the Panel relied on scientific evidence to assess the nature and
character of the risk, and did not merely rely on the "hypotheses" of
Therefore, Canada's second necessity
French authorities.199
argument failed.
The AB stated that it was "undisputed that WTO Members have
the right to determine the level of protection of health that they
consider appropriate in a given situation" and that the level chosen
by France was a "halt" to the spread of asbestos-related health
The AB further noted, "By prohibiting all forms of
risks. 20 0
amphibole asbestos, and by severely restricting the use of chrysotile
asbestos, the measure at issue is clearly designed and apt to achieve
that level of health protection." 20 1 The AB dismissed Canada's third
argument-that the undefined risk of substitute products was' a
barrier to considering the question of whether the decree would
reduce the health risk of asbestos-but addressed the concern about
substitute products by noting that the scientific evidence indicated
20 2
that the substitute products were less risky than asbestos.
The AB used a sliding scale to determine whether a measure was
"necessary." 203 The more "vital" or "important" the common interest
or end pursued, the easier it would be for the AB to accept measures
as "necessary" to achieve those ends. 20 4 Because the objective in this
case was "the preservation of human life and health through the
elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening,
health risks posed by asbestos fibres," the value was "both vital and

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

166-75.
*46-49,
*44-45, 7 158-63.
*46, 166.
*46, 167.

at *47, 168.
(emphasis added).
at *47-49,

170-75.
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'20 5
important in the highest degree.
The AB applied a balancing test considering several factors to
determine whether an alternative measure was a "reasonably
Factors taken into
available" alternative required by GATT. 20 6
account in the balancing would include the difficulty of
implementation (other than "administrative" difficulty), the degree of
inconsistency with GATT, and the extent to which the alternative
measure "contributes to the realization of the end pursued. '20 7 The
AB held that the alternative measure of "controlled use" would not
achieve France's chosen level of health protection because scientific
evidence showed that a significant residual health risk could still
exist in some circumstances-particularly with respect to the users of
Therefore, because
cement products containing asbestos.2 0 8
"controlled use" of asbestos did not "achieve the same end" of health
protection, the European Union established a prima facie case that
there was no "reasonably available alternative" to the ban of the
209
decree.
In Asbestos, the AB reserved a certain amount of leeway to states
By permitting
regarding their domestic health measures.
"qualitative" proof of a health risk-determining the "reasonableness"
of available alternatives based on the domestic health objectives of
the state, rather than a more objective standard, and not requiring a
state to defend its alternate health plan-the AB lowered the bar for
the first step of the exceptions test using Article XX(b), particularly
when the state's purpose was to preserve human life and health.
However, both the Asbestos DSB Panel and AB decisions raise
troubling questions about the more difficult second step of the test,
the "arbitrary and unjustified means" clause in the Article XX
chapeau.
The AB in Asbestos did not conduct a complete Article XX
analysis because Canada did not appeal the DSB Panel's finding that
the French ban did not violate the Article XX chapeau. 210 However,
the DSB Panel's tortured treatment of the chapeau in Asbestos set the
2 11
stage for the AB's analysis of the chapeau in Shrimp Compliance.
The AB's silence is even more glaring given the Asbestos DSB Panel's
unorthodox treatment of the Article XX chapeau's "arbitrary and

172.
173-74.
172.
174.
172-75 (emphasis added).

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at *48,
Id. at *48,
Id. at *48,
Id. at *48,
Id. at *48,

210.

Id. at *43-49,

155-75.

WTO Report of the Panel: European Communities-Measures Affecting
211.
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/R, 2000 WL 1449942 (Sept. 18,
2000) [hereinafter Asbestos DSB Report].
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unjustified discrimination" and "disguised restriction" clauses. 212 The
AB was extremely quick to correct the DSB's changed chapeau
213
analysis in Shrimp, so its omission in Asbestos is notable.

In Asbestos, the DSB Panel began a normal Article XX analysis
by citing Gasoline and Shrimp, and by analyzing whether the French
ban met the specific exception in Article XX(b). 2 14 However, after the
Panel found that the ban met the requirements of XX(b), the Panel
first commented that the chapeau asked about the "manner" of the
domestic measure application, but concluded that France had not
acted in "bad faith" or in an "unreasonable," "improper," or "abusive"
manner. 215 The Panel then split its "arbitrary and unjustifiable
two parts: "discrimination" and
discrimination" analysis into
"arbitrary and unjustifiable."2 16
The Panel editorialized that the "context" of the chapeau's first
clause suggested that a determination of "discrimination" was
appropriate, even though the decisive question was whether the
measure was "arbitrary or unjustifiable" and did not involve the
question of whether "discrimination" existed. 217 Although the DSB
Panel explored the meaning of the admittedly-superfluous element of
"discrimination," attempting to differentiate it from the meaning of
"discrimination" in the context of the original GATT violation, the
2 18
Panel ended with a restatement of the irrelevance of the exercise.
The Panel then "concluded" that Canada did not rebut the European
the French ban was not "arbitrary
Community's prima facie case that
2 19
or unjustifiable discrimination."
Noting that the AB interpreted the "disguised restriction" in the
chapeau's second clause broadly, the Panel stated that the actual
scope of the words was undefined.22 0 The Panel cited Gasoline for the
proposition that determinations of "arbitrary or unjustifiable
similar
shared
restriction"
"disguised
discrimination" and
2 21
chapeau
of
the
the
standards
confusing
To
avoid
considerations.
with substantive trade rules, the Panel posited that the word
"disguised," rather than "restriction," was the key to understanding
"disguised restriction," and further cited another AB report for factors
suggesting "disguise"-the design, architecture, and revealing

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Asbestos DSB Report, supra note 211, at *441.
Shrimp AB Report, supra note 163, at 150-53,
Asbestos DSB Report, supra note 212, at *441,
Id. at *453, 8.224.
Id. at *454, 8.226.
Id. at *455, 8.229.
Id. at *454, 8.227.
Id. at *455, 8.229.
8.232-33.
Id. at *455,
Id. at *456, 8.235.

114-22.
8.167.
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structure of a measure. 222 However, instead of pursuing this line of
reasoning, the Panel decided that it was "unnecessary" to determine
whether discrimination might constitute a disguised restriction

because no discrimination had been identified. As discussed below,
the Asbestos Panel's confusing treatment of the chapeau was a
function of the AB's limited chapeau analysis in Shrimp. After the
Asbestos DSB Panel and AB decisions, the Shrimp Compliance AB
incorporated the Asbestos Panel's concerns in its conclusions about
the chapeau.
D. The Shrimp and Shrimp Compliance AB Reports
In Shrimp, the United States passed a law, Section 609, for the
protection of sea turtles that banned the importation of shrimp and
shrimp products harvested with technology that endangered
turtles. 22 3 The only exceptions to the import ban were for products
from harvesting nations that either had a regulatory scheme and
incidental take-rate comparable to the scheme and take-rate of the
United States, or for products from fishing environments that did not
present a threat to sea turtles.

22 4

These provisions essentially meant

that fishermen harvesting shrimp mechanically in jurisdictions with
any of the five sea turtle species were required to use turtle excluder
2 25
devices, or TEDs, all the time as practiced in the United States.
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged Section 609 as
violating the chapeau by discriminating among exporting countries
regarding negotiations and phase-in periods, and by omitting22 a6
serious attempt to reach a cooperative multilateral agreement.
The United States argued that Section 609 met the requirements of
Article XX(g) and the chapeau, or in the alternative, that it was
22 7
protected by Article XX(b).
The AB found that Section 609 met the requirements of Article
XX(g), and therefore it did not analyze the measure in terms of
Article XX(b). The AB found, however, similar to Gasoline, that
Section 609 violated both parts of the chapeau's "arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination" clause. 228 The AB applied the two-step
test set out in Gasoline and then distinguished "unjustifiable"

222.
Id. at *456, 8.236.
223.
Conservation of Sea Turtles; Importation of Shrimp, Pub. L. No. 101-162,
103 Stat. 1037.
224.
WTO, India etc. versus U.S.: 'Shrimp-Turtle',at http://www.wto.int/englishl
tratope/envire/edis08_e.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
225.
Id.; Shrimp AB Report, supranote 163, at 118.
226.
Shrimp AB Report, supra note 163, at 133,
40-42.
227.
Id. at 129, 25.
228.
Id. at 160, 146.

20021

THE FUTURE OF INTERNA TIONAL TOBACCO CONTROL

1761

229

discrimination from "arbitrary" discrimination.
Section 609 was held to be "unjustifiable" discrimination for
three reasons. 230 First, it was coercive both in substance and in its
effects. 23 1 By nature, an import prohibition is ordinarily the heaviest
"weapon" in a Member's trade measure armory. 232 The United States
again failed to enter into serious, across-the-board negotiations before
enforcing the import ban-just as it did in Gasoline.23 3 In its actual
effect, the ban forced other foreign governments to change their
234
policies and adopt policies identical to the United States.
Second, the United States inflexibly applied Section 609.235
Although the United States was supposed to find "comparable"
regulatory schemes acceptable, in practice the United States required
identical regulatory schemes. 236 The AB, citing four international
agreements that discourage states from establishing unilateral
environmental measures, said that the United States should have
seriously considered the different situations of affected states and
23 7
offered the implied flexibility that was missing in practice.
Third, the United States preferentially implemented the
measure by giving 14 Caribbean and Western Atlantic states more
phase-in time and technical assistance than all other states.23 8 The
cumulative effect of these acts and omissions made Section 609 a
23 9
means of "unjustifiable" discrimination.
Section 609 was also a means of "arbitrary" discrimination for
three reasons. 240 First, as above, the United States' inflexible and
unilateral manner in applying Section 609 was arbitrary, as well as
unjustifiable. 241 Second and third, the United States lacked fair and
transparent procedures in its "singularly informal and casual"
certification process, such as an appeals procedure or the issuance of
formal, written, reasoned decisions explaining why applications for
certification were accepted or rejected. 242 Therefore, although the
shrimp import ban met the general characteristics of Article XX(g) in

229.
Id. at 161-75, IT 150-86.
230.
Id. at 166-72, IN 161-76.
231.
Id. at 166, 171, 77 161, 171. "The standards of the chapeau ... project both
substantive and procedural requirements." Id. at 165-66, 160.
232.
Id. at 171, 7 171.
Id. at 167-71,
166-72. This omission was more egregious than in
233.
Gasoline because Section 609 specifically provided for such negotiation. Id.
Id. at 166, 161.
234.
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at 166, 162.
237.
Id. at 166-70, 7 161-69.
238.
Id. at 171-72, 77 173-75.
239.
Id. at 172, 176.
240.
Id. at 172-74, NI 177-84.
241.
Id. at 172-73, 177.
242.
Id. at 173-74, IT 180-84.
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the first part of the two-tiered test, it failed at least two of the three
2 43
clauses in the chapeau and could not be justified under Article XX.
The Shrimp AB's finding made sense in the context of Shrimp.
In Shrimp, the U.S. TED law was "unjustifiable" because it coerced
foreign governments to change their policies, did not allow foreign
governments flexibility to change their policies, and contained
preferential treatment for certain countries. 244 The U.S. TED law's
inflexibility and lack of fair and transparent measures for
certification also led the Shrimp AB to conclude that the U.S. TED
245
law was arbitrary.
However, in the Asbestos context, these criteria make less sense.
Asbestos is distinguishable from Shrimp on its facts because the
French ban on asbestos did not "coerce" Canada to change domestic
policies or methods by which Canada performed its asbestos business,
nor did it dictate a strict range, of change for Canada to adopt.
However, the AB noted in Shrimp that the "coercive" effect of import
prohibitions and an arguably-complete ban on asbestos imports
would, in fact, have a much greater coercive effect on Canada's
domestic business "policies" than requiring the use of equipment like
the TEDs. If Shrimp's explanations of "arbitrary or unjustifiable"
were strictly applied, then the health measure in Asbestos could have
been insufficiently distinguishable from the U.S. TED law in Shrimp,
and could potentially have suffered the same fate.
Under this framework, the Asbestos Panel's prefacing comment
before its chapeau analysis makes more sense. 246 By looking at the
''manner" in which the domestic measure was applied and finding
that France had not acted in "bad faith," or in an "unreasonable,"
"improper," or "abusive" manner, the Panel was in fact suggesting
additional content to the current "arbitrary or unjustifiable" analysis
under Shrimp. The Asbestos Panel was attempting to distinguish the
U.S.' "bad faith" (in unilaterally using trade as a tool to push its
environmental scheme onto other countries without concern as to the
effects of such use) from France's plainly national agenda (in banning
a life-threatening substance for the benefits of its citizens).
In Shrimp Compliance, the AB clarified Shrimp and met some of
the Asbestos Panel's concerns. 247 The AB stated that in order to avoid
the "unjustifiable" discrimination between member states, the nature
and extent of the U.S. duty to negotiate with states was to negotiate
in serious "good faith" without disparity in the amount of active
participation and financial support in its negotiations, and without

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

186-88.
Id. at 174-75,
See supra notes 230-39.
See supra notes 240-42.
See supra note 215.
Shrimp Compliance AB Report, supra note 165, at *23-35.
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any requirement that the United States actually conclude an
agreement with the member state. 248 The AB found that a domestic
measure must be flexible in design and application in order to avoid
being either "unjustifiable" or "arbitrary" discrimination among
states. 24 9 However, flexibility meant that the United States could
require "comparably effective," but not "essentially the same,"
practices of a state as a condition to trade rather than requiring that
the United States tailor its measures to provide for each state's
specific conditions. 250 The AB explicitly stated that to rule that no
state could require some compliance with certain policies as a
condition to trade would render most, if not all, of the Article XX
25 1
exceptions "inutile."
Shrimp Compliance improved on Shrimp's interpretation of the
chapeau requirements, and helps to further distinguish Shrimp from
the Asbestos or FCTC case. Further interpretation of the "arbitrary
and unjustifiable," as well as the "disguised," discrimination clauses
by the AB should consider the Asbestos Panel's suggestions if they
examine any domestic measures implementing the FCTC.
E. The Application to Tobacco Control
To meet the exceptions to general international trade rules
against quantitative restrictions, FCTC states must meet the twostep exceptions test. After Asbestos' explanation of Article XX(b),
tobacco control measures should meet the requirements of the first
prong: FCTC measures should be found necessary to protect human
life and health by eliminating or reducing the well-documented and
life-threatening health risks posed by tobacco.
A reading that could help to further distinguish Asbestos, and
the FCTC, from Shrimp involves fleshing out the Asbestos AB's
comment that the French ban on asbestos was "clearly designed and
apt. ' 25 2 A state desiring tobacco control could argue that although
the observation was made within the context of the Article XX(b)
"necessity" of the measure, a "clearly designed and apt" measure,
such as the French ban or a tobacco control measure, should
exemplify a measure that is "undisguised" in design, architecture, or
structure. Similarly, the clarity of the measure's design should be
considered as evidence of its justified and non-arbitrary nature.
By contrast, unclear or "inapt" measures would certainly be
arbitrary or unjustifiable because they would irrationally- or

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at *24-30.
Id. at *30-34.
Id.
Id. at *31.
See supranote 201.
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incidentally interfere with trade. For example, vague, ambiguous, or
overbroad measures would be examples of unclear, inept, and
arbitrary, or unjustifiable measures. These elements could mirror
the "relate to" requirement in Article XX(g), which would bar a
domestic environmental measure that was "disproportionately wide
in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective. '253 In
addition to the Panel's added four elements, these examples
demonstrate the implicit limits to avoid the abuse of the exceptionsthe chapeau's ultimate objective.
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE

TO THE

WTO?

Should the WHO have its own adjudicatory organ? The creation
of a judicial body would be consistent with the WHA's authority
under Article 18(1) of the WHO Constitution, stating that a function
of the WHA is to "establish such other institutions as it may consider
desirable." In fact, the WHO has recently proposed a new body, the
254
Committee of Arbitration, to interpret the IHR.

The recent proliferation of international judicial bodies has
2 55
created debate about the desirability of more international courts.
Opponents of the addition of more international courts argue that the
ICJ should be the central organ of international law to promote
structure and consistency throughout the varied body of international
law. 256

However, two strong arguments support of the growing

number of international courts.
First, because of the relative newness of international law, its
authority is not yet solidified due to its selective acceptance and
exercise. 257 Therefore, more international law should be created to
encourage the use of, and to satisfy the demand for, international
forums before prematurely constricting the supply of international
law. 258

Second, a strict hierarchy has not been established, and

different courts should compete for their positions in a hierarchy by
"free competition," rather than a top-down "anointing" of the ICJ as

Wofford, supra note 137, at 580.
253.
254.
Future of the WHO, supra note 39, at 1108.
255.
Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding
Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney, The
Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 30 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (1996); Cesare P. R. Romano,
The Proliferationof InternationalJudicialBodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 709 (1999).
Abi-Saab, supra note 255, at 920-25; Charney, supra note 255, at 70.
256.
257.
Charney, supra note 255, at 73-74.
258.
Id.
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259
the apex of the international dispute settlement system.
The WHO could create its own judicial body for a number of
reasons. For example, a WHO dispute settlement body could have
more expertise and be more efficient and consistent than the ICJ in
deciding technical matters. 260 The authority of the WHO regarding
technical questions is evident in its constitutional functions,
including the provision of technical assistance and support. 26 1 The
WHO Constitution requires WHA members to be composed of
"persons most qualified by their technical competence in the field of
health. '2 62 Shared knowledge among the members of the WHO
should enable the it to reach better decisions than courts without
such expertise. Common knowledge could reduce differences in
opinion, creating more consistency in the law.
Moreover, as the FCTC's proponent, the WHO would be the bestequipped to interpret the intended meaning of those treaties. A WHO
judicial body could directly respond to legal challenges attempting to
redraft the terms of the agreements, without having to rely on the
abilities of an outside decisionmaker to correctly deduce its intent.
The WHO could establish an interpretive body-not subject to
the limitations of other courts, such as the ICJ's jurisdictional
restriction to cases involving states as parties. 26 3 New international
courts, such as the European Court of Justice and the International
Criminal Court, hear cases involving parties other than states, such
as natural persons or corporations. 264 Given that the FCTC's biggest
opponents are multinational tobacco corporations, the WHO could
possibly benefit from this opportunity to exercise direct control over a
complaint by a corporation.
However, the WHO has no "executive"-type enforcement power
comparable to the WTO's dispute settlement system's threat of trade
sanctions. 265 Without such sanctions, the benefits of a WHO opinion
would be less tangible-perhaps merely the promotion of normative
values of health at the expense of trade, the changing of cognitive
perceptions about what is in a state's best interest, or as persuasive

259.
Id. at 74.
260.
Article 26 of the ICJ Statute states that the Court may form chambers of
three or more judges to deal with particular categories of cases, for example, "labour
cases and cases relating to transit and communications." ICJ Statute, supra note 107,
art. 26.
261.
WHO CONST. art. 2.
262.
WHO CONST. art. 11.
263.
ICJ Statute, supra note 107, art. 1.
264.
PICT Research Matrix, supra note 104.
265.
See generally WHO CONST.
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authority to which domestic courts could cite. 266 It has been said that
public international law works primarily through the "concurrence of
decentralized
pressures"
generated
by
the
international
community, 267 and that the most lasting achievements in the areas of
international human rights and environmental law have not been in
the compliance of states, but rather have been made through the
construction and recognition of their respective normative
frameworks in treaties.2 68 However, the promulgation of the FCTC
itself has already served those roles. Given that the WTO has
established a substantive shelter for health measures under Article
XX(b), parties would not likely come before a merely-advisory court
without enforcement powers.

VIII. CONCLUSION

So far, the AB has applied the Article XX exceptions against a
domestic measure that discriminated against foreign importers in
favor of domestic producers (Gasoline), against a domestic measure
that treated two importers differently (Shrimp), and in favor of a
domestic measure necessary to human health that contained no
preference between exporting countries or domestic producers
(Asbestos). The AB established achievable protections for health
measures in Asbestos, Shrimp, and Shrimp Compliance. Domestic
measures implementing the FCTC that lack trade discriminations
among foreign producers and domestic producers should be upheld
under GATT's Article XX(b) exception.
In addition to the AB's consistent and rigorous legal
interpretations and holdings regarding the Article XX exceptions, the
AB has recognized the importance of non-trade objectives in its strong
language at the end of Gasoline269 and Shrimp.2 70 These cases

266. WHO, Technical Briefing Series: What Makes International Agreements
Effective? Some Pointers for the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at
34, WHO Doc. WHO/NCD/TFI/99.4, at http://tobacco.who.int/en/fctc/papers/paper4.pdf.
267.
Charney, supra note 255, at 73.
268.
Future of the WHO, supra note 39, at 1105.
269.
Gasoline AB Report, supra note 161, at 633-34.
It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what this does not
mean. It does not mean, or imply, that the ability of any WTO Member to take
measures to control air pollution or, more generally, to protect the
environment, is at issue. That would be to ignore the fact that Article XX of the
General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important state
interests-including the protection of human health, as well as the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources-to find expression .... WTO
Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on
the environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental
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suggest that the WHO may be able to depend on the WTO to give a
full amount of credit to the GATT's trade exceptions, and not to
unduly thwart the progress of the FCTC on the basis of trade.
Therefore, there is less cause to investigate alternatives to
adjudication in the WTO until a less-duplicative scenario arises and,
so far, the FCTC as it stands is sufficiently protected from objections
on the basis of trade.
Alyssa Woo*

objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far
as concerns the WTO, that autonomy'is circumscribed only by the need to
respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered
agreements.
Id.
270.

Shrimp AB Report, supra note 163, at 174,

185.

In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided
in this appeal. We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the
environment is of no significance to the Members of the WHO. Clearly, it is.
We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the wTo
cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea
turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided that sovereign
states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either
within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or
to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do.
Id.

J.D. Candidate, 2003, Vanderbilt University; A.B. University of California at

Berkeley. Thanks to Professor Steve Charnovitz, Professor Jonathan Charney and
Professor Harold Maier, as well as Christopher Ruggerio, for their support and advice.
This Note is dedicated to my family: my mother, father, sister and brother. You are the
best.

*

*

*

